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Uncovering the Hidden Conflicts in Securities Class
Action Litigation: Lessons from the State Street Case
By Benjamin P. Edwards* and Anthony Rickey**
Courts, Congress, and commentators have long worried that stockholder plaintiffs in secu-
rities and M&A litigation and their counsel may pursue suits that benefit themselves rather
than absent stockholders or the corporations in which they invest. Following congressional
reforms that encouraged the appointment of institutional stockholders as lead plaintiffs in
securities actions, significant academic commentary has focused on the problem of “pay to
play”—the possibility that class action law firms encourage litigation by making donations
to politicians with influence over institutional stockholders, particularly public sector pen-
sion funds.
A recent federal securities class action in the District of Massachusetts, however, suggests
that the networks of influence between class plaintiffs and their counsel are much more
complex and difficult to detect. After appointing a special master to look into fee issues,
the court discovered that a large class action firm had paid over $4 million in “bare refer-
ral” fees to an attorney who did little work on the case but had recommended the larger
firm to a public sector pension fund “after considerable favors, political activity, money
spent and time dedicated in Arkansas.”
This is only one of the less-visible ways that class counsel may route benefits to class plain-
tiffs. Current class action processes do not routinely identify these potential conflicts of in-
terest. Instead, they tend to surface when nonlitigants bring them to public attention.
Because neither the lead plaintiff nor the defendants have a strong incentive to voluntarily
address these conflicts, we propose revisions to the class certification process that would
require class plaintiffs to disclose more information regarding their relationships with
class counsel. We also propose that courts routinely appoint special masters or class guard-
ians as part of the settlement approval process to ensure that class plaintiffs’ statements are
subject to discovery and adversarial review.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law;
J.D., Columbia Law School.
** Principal, Margrave Law LLC.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress, courts, and academics have long worried that securities class action
plaintiffs and their counsel may bring lawsuits that benefit themselves rather
than their corporations or absent stockholders.1 Enticed by lucrative class action
awards, class counsel may pursue cases more with a view toward maximizing
law firm profit than vindicating stockholder rights.
In theory, representative plaintiffs can monitor their counsel to ensure that the
lawyers are protecting stockholders’ interests. However, class plaintiffs may also
suffer from conflicts of interest. The most straightforward conflict arises when
class counsel agrees to share fees with a client outright—a practice that has fa-
mously resulted in the criminal convictions of prominent class action attorneys.2
Other potential conflicts are more subtle. Class representatives with small stock-
holdings may have insufficient motive to monitor counsel. Meanwhile, class
counsel may entice institutional investors, and particularly public sector pension
funds, by contributing to politicians with influence over the funds.
The need for stockholder plaintiffs to monitor their attorneys is most acute in
the settlement context, when class counsel typically ask a court both to terminate
a lawsuit, releasing corporate defendants from further litigation risk, and to ap-
prove the payment of counsel’s fees, either from corporate coffers or the stock-
holders’ recovery.3 Although judicial review provides some bulwark against
compromised plaintiffs and counsel, adversarial review of settlements is rare,
1. See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
2. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 76 (2015) (“[I]nves-
tigation found that Milberg had retained some individuals to serve as ‘in-house’ plaintiffs, promising
them, in some cases, a percentage of the overall class recovery. . . . Ultimately, four of the ‘name’
partners of Milberg, Weiss—Weiss, Lerach, Bershad, and Schulman—went to prison.”).
3. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892–94 (Del. Ch. 2016) (describing
settlement process); Grosso v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 983 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
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and no settling party has a reason to bring uncomfortable facts to the attention of
a reviewing court.4 Plaintiffs who benefit from side deals have little reason to dis-
close them; and settling defendants have scant incentive to disrupt a settlement
process by highlighting such relationships to a court, even if they are aware of
troubling facts.
Partly in response to these concerns, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in 1995.5 The PSLRA, adopting a suggestion
from an academic article, sought to improve plaintiff monitoring of class counsel
by adopting a presumption that the largest plaintiff stockholder—often an insti-
tution like a pension fund—would be the presumptive lead plaintiff.6
The PSLRA’s reforms, however, did less to address conflicts of interest that
might afflict institutional stockholders. In the years following the PSLRA’s enact-
ment, scholars discussed the risk of “pay to play”—the risk that class counsel
would entice politically connected public sector plaintiffs, and in particular pen-
sion funds, by converting some of their fees into payments to politicians well
placed to influence the funds.7 To date, however, this scholarship has focused
primarily on direct political donations.8
A recent $300 million settlement in litigation against State Street Bank and
Trust Company (the “State Street litigation”),9 however, suggests that the potential
conflicts between institutional plaintiffs and class counsel extend beyond this
straightforward “pay to play.” A newspaper investigation revealed that the plain-
tiffs’ lawyers, who had received nearly $75 million in fees, had double-counted
some of their staff attorney hours, “inflating their combined bills by $4 million.”10
Unsettled by the revelations, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts appointed a special master to look into fee-related issues.11
4. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Vinita M. Juneja, Making Securities Class Actions More Responsive to
the Modern Shareholder, in SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 181, 184 (Edward J. Yodowitz
et al. eds., 1994) (“By the time fees are recommended, defendants have already agreed to the settle-
ment and do not care how it is divided among the shareholders and their attorneys.”); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) (“[S]ettlement hearings
are typically pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel. Because both
parties desire that the settlement be approved, they have every incentive to present it as entirely
fair.”).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730.
6. See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
7. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 74 (“By making generous donations to a comptroller’s campaign
fund, plaintiff ’s law firms in effect gained the right to rent the pension fund and use it as their lead
plaintiff in securities litigation.”).
8. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to Play
in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650 (2011).
9. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., C.A. Nos. 11-10230-MLW, 11-12049-
MLW, 12-11698-MLW (D. Mass.).
10. Andrea Estes, Critics Hit Law Firm’s Bills After Class Action Lawsuit, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 17, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/17/lawyers-overstated-legal-costs-millions-state-street-
case-opening-window-questionable-billing-practices/tmeeuAaEaa4Ki6VhBpQHQM/story.html.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 35–37.
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That investigation revealed further cause for concern. After receiving its por-
tion of the fee award, Labaton Sucharow LLP (“Labaton”) paid $4.1 million to a
Texas attorney named Damon Chargois (“Chargois”) for introducing Labaton to
the lead plaintiff, the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System (“ATRS”).12 Chargois
described his relationship to Labaton in an email to the law firm:
We got you ATRS as a client after considerable favors, political activity, money spent
and time dedicated in Arkansas, and Labaton would use ATRS to seek lead counsel
appointments in institutional investor fraud and misrepresentation cases. Where
Labaton is successful in getting appointed lead counsel and obtains a settlement
or judgment award, we split Labaton’s attorney fee award 80/20, period.13
However, the district court found that Chargois had “done no work on the case”
and that his name, payment, and role had not been disclosed to ATRS, the class,
or the court.14
The email, undisclosed fee, and other revelations in the State Street litigation
provide a window into what may be a hidden market, where politically con-
nected lawyers broker relationships between institutional investors and class
counsel who earn fees in contingency class actions.15 This market remains hid-
den from judicial scrutiny, kept invisible by the often nonadversarial nature of
the settlement and class certification processes.
Based on the revelations from the State Street litigation and other stockholder
class actions, this article recommends reforms that would enable reviewing
courts to monitor class action settlements more closely for potential conflicts
of interest. First, we briefly summarize the role lead plaintiffs play in corporate
and securities litigation. We then describe the unusual circumstances in the State
Street litigation that led to the discovery of ties between a securities litigation
powerhouse, a state pension fund, and the attorney who brought them together
(for a fee). Next, we compare these techniques to others that securities litigators
may employ to transfer benefits to institutional investors without directly sharing
fees and explain why current class certification procedures would not uncover
these relationships. Finally, we propose reforms that would allow courts to de-
tect troubling relationships between class plaintiffs and their counsel so that
judges may better defend stockholders from the risk that litigants will pursue
cases for their own benefit rather than for the benefit of the stockholders that
they purportedly represent.
12. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., C.A. No. 11-10230-MLW, C.A. No.
11-12049-MLW, C.A. No. 12-11698-MLW, 2018 WL 3216012, at *2–3 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018).
13. Id. (quoting email from Chargois).
14. Id.
15. See John C. Coffee, The Market for Lead Plaintiffs, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 24, 2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/09/24/the-market-for-lead-plaintiffs/ (“[A]n active market
may today exist in which politically connected attorneys charge extraordinary contingent fees, requir-
ing payments in the millions of dollars, for introducing and connecting prominent plaintiffs’ law
firms with public pension funds and other institutions capable of serving as lead plaintiffs in
major class actions.”); see also Choi et al., supra note 8, at 651 (“The available anecdotal evidence
raises suspicion that class action law firms are buying lead counsel status with campaign contribu-
tions, that is, lawyers are paying to play.”).
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II. THE ROLE OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN CORPORATE CLASS ACTIONS
Securities litigator William Lerach boasted that he had “the greatest law
practice in the world” because he had “no clients.”16 While this may be an
overstatement, many individual stockholder plaintiffs play a markedly passive
role in securities litigation. Moreover, the nonadversarial nature of the class
settlement process makes it difficult to detect when class counsel influence
their clients by inappropriately sharing class action fees. Lerach famously
served time in federal prison after pleading guilty to a conspiracy charge re-
lated to the payment of kickbacks to class action plaintiffs.17 These payments
came to light only after one of his firm’s clients—facing charges for insurance
fraud—agreed to testify against the firm in the hope of receiving a lighter
sentence.18
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, in part
in response to the perceived threat posed by such relationships.19 Attempting to
revitalize client oversight for securities class action litigation, Congress embraced
an idea proposed in a 1995 law review article: encouraging institutional inves-
tors to serve as lead plaintiffs.20 The article suggested that the stockholder
with the largest loss should serve as the presumptive lead plaintiff for the
class, an idea that ultimately formed the basis for the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff pro-
vision.21 Theoretically, a sophisticated pension fund or other institutional inves-
tor with a significant loss would more diligently oversee class counsel than a
small stockholder, who might otherwise permit her lawyers to settle cases
16. Peter J. Henning, Behind the Rise and Fall of a Class Action King, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 1,
2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/behind-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-class-action-king/; see
also Carrie Johnson, Lerach Gets Two Years in Prison for Kickbacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2008), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/11/AR2008021101454.html.
17. Lerach Is Sentenced to 2 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 11, 2008), https://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2008/02/11/lerach-is-sentenced-to-2-years-in-prison/ (describing prosecution’s claim
that Lerach’s firm paid $11.3 million in kickbacks to people who became plaintiffs); see also John
Nocera, Serving Time, but Lacking Remorse, N.Y. TIMES ( June 7, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/
2008/06/07/business/07nocera.html (describing problem of secretly paying off “professional
plaintiffs”).
18. See Peter Elkind, The Fall of America’s Meanest Law Firm, FORTUNE (Nov. 3, 2006), http://ar
chive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/13/8393127/index.htm.
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730.
20. See Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional In-
vestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995); Elliott J. Weiss,
The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61
VAND. L. REV. 543, 549 (2008) (“The Committee thereafter reported out a bill that substantially mir-
rored our recommendations, providing for . . . selection as lead plaintiff of the plaintiff or applicant
with the largest financial interest, allowing the lead plaintiff to appoint and retain lead counsel, and
restricting discovery directed at applicants for appointment as lead plaintiff.”).
21. Compare Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 20, at 2105 (“[B]ecause the named plaintiff or group
of plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the outcome of an action has the greatest economic
incentive to monitor class counsel’s performance effectively, courts should adopt a presumption
that that plaintiff or group will ‘most adequately’ represent class members’ interests.”), with 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii), (vi) (2018) (creating rebuttable presumption that stockholder with
the largest financial stake is the “most adequate” representative).
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quickly for contingency fees.22 The article memorably proposed to “let the
money do the monitoring,” relying upon institutional investor lead plaintiffs to
have the capability and incentives to oversee counsel.23
Although institutional lead plaintiffs have been associated with some positive
effects, they have not proved to monitor their lawyers as independently and vig-
orously as Congress might have hoped.24 Institutional investors—particularly
state pension funds—have political, financial, and legal interests not shared by
other stockholders. For instance, the leaders of state pension funds may be
elected by union members or appointed by elected representatives. One academic
study noted that any restraining effect that institutional stockholders had on con-
tingency fee requests virtually disappeared among institutional investors whose
managers had accepted campaign contributions from class counsel.25
Thus, although the presence of sophisticated lead plaintiffs can theoretically
protect against a host of harms to passive and absent class members, that is
not always true in practice. The State Street litigation shows how this theoretical
oversight role can be undermined by a complex web of real-world relationships
that judicial eyes rarely see.
III. THE STATE STREET REVELATIONS
In late 2016, the Boston Globe’s Spotlight Team turned its attention to Boston’s
Thornton Law Firm (“Thornton”).26 The Globe’s initial stories involved allega-
tions of potential straw donations from Thornton partners to political candi-
dates.27 A few months later, the Globe began asking more questions about
how fees from the State Street litigation flowed through Thornton. The Spotlight
22. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 20, at 2054–55 (“Controversy abounds about securities
class actions, centering on . . . attorneys operating on a contingent fee basis initiat[ing] most such
suits in the names of ‘figurehead’ plaintiffs with little at stake . . . . [C]ritics focus on the agency
costs inherent in class actions initiated and maintained by attorneys who operate without meaningful
client supervision.”).
23. Id. at 2126 (explaining that institutional investors “have the knowledge and financial sophis-
tication necessary to serve as effective litigation monitors” and that their financial state “would give
them an incentive to do that job well”).
24. See Jessica Erickson, The Gatekeepers of Shareholder Litigation, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 250 (2017)
(“[I]nstitutional investors have not exercised their new monitoring responsibilities as well or as cre-
atively as lawmakers might have hoped.”).
25. See Choi et al., supra note 8, at 651 (“State pension funds whose managers have received cam-
paign contributions, however, appear to be less vigorous in negotiating attorney fees. The state pen-
sion funds whose officials received the largest contributions from the lead attorney firms negotiate for
attorney fees that are statistically indistinguishable from the fees in cases with individual investors
serving as lead plaintiffs.”).
26. See Andrea Estes & Viveca Novak, Law Firm “Bonuses” Tied to Political Donations, Bos. GLOBE
(Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/10/29/prominent-democratic-law-firm-
pays-questionable-bonuses-partners-for-campaign-contributions/GpD5tRQZR7pRe8hwAvQw8N/
story.html.
27. Id. For its part, Thornton stated that the payments “weren’t really bonuses but the partners’ own
money, taken out of each one’s equity in the firm.” Andrea Estes, Thornton Law Firm Didn’t Break State
Campaign Finance Laws, Prosecutor Says, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2018/04/18/thornton-law-firm-didn-break-state-campaign-finance-laws-prosecutor-says/
XiRBRPxjEWyrfsmPvhxxtM/story.html.
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investigation pointed out that Thornton’s managing partner, Garrett Bradley, had
claimed that his younger brother, Michael Bradley, worked for the firm as “a
$500-an-hour ‘staff attorney,’” even though the younger Bradley brother often
worked for “$53 an hour as a court-appointed defender in Quincy District
Court.”28 The reporters also discovered that at least one lawyer whose rate
was listed as $425 an hour was “actually paid just $30 an hour.”29 These pointed
questions prompted Labaton, lead counsel in the State Street litigation, to write
to United States District Court Judge Mark L. Wolf to inform him that some “in-
advertent errors” had been made in the materials submitted in support of its fee
award, including the double-counting of some staff attorney hours.30
A month later, the Globe published yet another story on Thornton, describing
the firm’s managing partner as “essentially work[ing] as a salesman for Laba-
ton.”31 The story described the flow of funds from class action fee awards,
through Thornton and Labaton, into the election campaign treasuries of officials
who oversaw a pension fund—a client of Labaton and Thornton.32 According to
the Boston Globe, about half of one county treasurer’s campaign donations over a
ten-year period—about $100,000—came from lawyers at Thornton and Laba-
ton.33 That official oversaw the Plymouth County retirement system, on whose
behalf Thornton and Labaton had filed several securities class action lawsuits.34
The facts revealed by the Boston Globe and Labaton’s letter caused the State
Street court to reconsider whether the $75 million dollar fee award was appro-
priate.35 Nine days after the Boston Globe published its story detailing the con-
nections between Thornton, Labaton, and Plymouth County, Judge Wolf issued
a memorandum and order discussing his “questions about the accuracy and re-
liability of the representations plaintiffs’ counsel made” in their request for an
award of fees and setting a “hearing to address the possible appointment of a spe-
cial master.”36 After giving the parties an opportunity to object, Judge Wolf “took
the evidently then-unprecedented step of appointing a master to investigate
28. Andrea Estes, Critics Hit Law Firm’s Bills After Class Action Lawsuit, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 17, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/17/lawyers-overstated-legal-costs-millions-state-street-
case-opening-window-questionable-billing-practices/tmeeuAaEaa4Ki6VhBpQHQM/story.html.
29. Id.
30. Letter from David J. Goldsmith to U.S. Dist. Ct. Judge Mark L. Wolf, Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v.
State St. Bank & Tr. Co., Case No. 1:11-cv-10230-MLW (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2016).
31. Andrea Estes, Firms Profited from Garrett Bradley’s Ties, BOS. GLOBE ( Jan. 28, 2017), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/01/28/prim-and-proper-statehouse-leader-law-firm-profited-
from-ties-public-retirement-funds/YKWbyFzQb6Li2VNTjbu18O/story.html.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 232 F. Supp. 3d 189, 193 (D. Mass.
2017).
36. Id. at 191. In issuing his order, the court relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h)(4),
which allows a court to “‘refer issues related to the amount of the [attorneys’ fee] award to a special
master . . . as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).’” Id. at 193 (quoting Rule 23(h)(4)). Rule 54(d)(2)(D)
allows referrals for a special master to consider “the value of services.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(D)
(“[T]he court may refer issues concerning the value of services to a special master . . . .”).
Lessons from the State Street Case 1557
whether false and misleading statements had been made in the petition for fees
and related issues.”37
The master’s investigation soon uncovered additional cause for concern.
Among other things, the master discovered that Labaton had paid Chargois
$4.1 million for his role in introducing Labaton to ATRS. It also emerged that
“political leaders” in Arkansas had “persuaded” ATRS’s executive director to
give priority to class action lawsuits.38
Judge Wolf expressed concern that “the origins of Labaton’s relationship with
ATRS . . . might diminish ATRS’ incentive to represent the class vigorously” and
noted that the master’s report raised questions about “whether ‘all of those mil-
lions of dollars stopped with Mr. Chargois.’”39 After all, Mr. Chargois’ email ex-
plained that he needed to collect his 20 percent to justify the cost of procuring
the relationship “‘after considerable favors, political activity, money spent and
time dedicated in Arkansas.’”40
In theory, a vigorous lead plaintiff actively supervises its lead counsel, exam-
ining fee requests to maximize the portion of the settlement retained by
the class. The efforts that ATRS undertook to supervise its class counsel remain
unclear, but they do not seem to have been effective. In the State Street litiga-
tion, Judge Wolf harshly criticized Thornton for declaring, under oath, that
one attorney’s regular rate was $500 per hour, when the firm could only
identify one case in which that attorney had been charged at even $300 per
hour.41 He similarly noted that Labaton submitted as “regular rates” for services
hourly rates that had “never been charged to paying clients.”42 ATRS did not
volunteer these facts. They were only discovered because the State Street
court took the apparently unprecedented step of appointing a special master
to investigate.43
The State Street litigation remains active and Judge Wolf has not yet decided
whether to impose sanctions. For its part, Labaton has submitted a report pre-
pared by a retired federal judge finding that the bare referrals paid to Chargois
were “unique” and “aberrational.”44
37. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., C.A. No. 11-10230-MLW, C.A. No.
11-12049-MLW, C.A. No. 12-11698-MLW, 2018 WL 3216012, at *1 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018).
38. Id. at *3.
39. Id. (quoting the court’s own comment at a hearing).
40. Id. at *2 (quoting email from Chargois).
41. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., 2018 WL 3216012, at *12 (“Although he claimed that Thornton’s reg-
ular rate for Michael Bradley was $500 an hour, Garrett Bradley could not identify any case in which
a client had been charged that rate, and identified only one Thornton case in which his brother was
billed at a rate of as much as $300 an hour.”).
42. Id. (“[T]he statements of Sucharow and Garrett Bradley heightened my concern about whether
false and misleading statements had been made under oath.”).
43. Id. at *13 (“[N]one of those cases resulted in the appointment of a master to investigate . . . . I
am evidently the first judge to have done that.”).
44. Phase I Report at 15, Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., No. 1:11-cv-10230-
MLW (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2019) (as amended Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Brown Report”].
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF UNDISCLOSED BENEFITS TO INSTITUTIONAL
CLASS PLAINTIFFS
The State Street litigation demonstrates how the standard process for approv-
ing class actions in state and federal courts fails to uncover potential conflicts
between class counsel and institutional plaintiffs and, in particular, public sector
pension funds. The case presents a rare example of a court taking extreme
measures to ascertain whether class counsel channeled settlement proceeds to
clients, the fiduciaries who control institutional clients, or third parties who
could influence them to become plaintiffs. However, the State Street court did
not appoint a special master because the plaintiff stumbled over some typical
procedural safeguard. Indeed, the court initially granted plaintiff ’s counsels’ re-
quest for $75 million in fees and expenses.45 Adversarial scrutiny only began
once the Spotlight Team made its extrajudicial case in the Boston Globe.
Much of the Spotlight Team’s investigation did not require resorting to whis-
tleblowers, secret informants, or the shoe-leather techniques of investigative
journalism. Anyone willing to scour through reams of dry data looking for in-
consistencies could have spotted key facts, such as the difference between a con-
tract-attorney’s supposed hourly rates and his or her court-awarded payments or
the double-counting of certain contract attorneys by multiple firms.46 In most
securities and corporate class actions, however, no one conducts a detailed in-
quiry into the plaintiff or class counsel as part of the settlement process. The lim-
ited review means that courts may never be made aware of potential conflicts of
interest or odd billing practices.
The possibility that courts are unknowingly approving payments between
class counsel and “referral” counsel is particularly troubling. The best that
could be said for this practice is that stockholders benefit by permitting class
counsel to pay bounties to referral firms where such bounties secure class rep-
resentatives who serve as effective monitors of counsel. Real-life data contradicts
this Panglossian view: a $4 million payment to Chargois did not secure a class
representative who noticed, for instance, double-counting of staff-attorney
time.47 Even if one accepted that entrepreneurial attorneys might engage in a
“race for the top,” seeking to pay for more effective class plaintiffs rather than
less-effective monitors, the current lack of voluntary disclosure prevents review-
ing courts or absent stockholders from evaluating the motive behind “referral”
payments.
It is likely that a closer look at other corporate or securities class actions would
uncover other potential conflicts. Consider, for instance, Garber v. Pharmacia
Corp., a securities class action filed in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey.48 On August 12, 2003, the district court appointed the Sar-
asota Firefighter’s Pension Fund (“Sarasota”) as one of six pension funds to lead
45. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 232 F. Supp. 3d 189, 191 (D. Mass. 2017).
46. Estes, supra note 28.
47. See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
48. Civ. A. No. 03-1519 (AET) (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2003).
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the class action and appointed the fund group’s chosen attorneys—a leading na-
tional class action firm—as class counsel.49 However, nine years later, when the
case settled, Sarasota’s papers also listed, as additional counsel for plaintiffs, a
local Florida law firm that represents the pension fund in other matters.50
In early 2013, the Garber court approved the settlement and awarded class
counsel, collectively, approximately $45 million in fees and expenses.51 As in
most securities class actions, the district court did not inquire into how much
each plaintiff ’s firm would receive in fees. Instead, it allowed lead counsel dis-
cretion to allocate fees “in a manner which . . . reflects each counsel’s contribu-
tion to the institution, prosecution, and resolution of the litigation.”52 Other
publicly available information, however, suggests that Sarasota’s Florida counsel
received a portion of the Garber fee.53
However, the Florida law firm’s relationship to Sarasota extended beyond class
actions: Sarasota paid the firm fees as compensation for other non-contingency
action work.54 After the district court approved the Garber settlement, Sarasota’s
Florida counsel informed Sarasota’s board of its decision not to raise Saraso-
ta’s monthly retainer fee, in part because the firm had received fees from Sara-
sota’s securities litigation:
We understand that the last ten years have been a difficult one for everybody so we
haven’t sought to increase our fees. So we are proposing not to do so through
2014. . . . We obviously did receive some income from the work we did on the se-
curities litigation case, which we disclosed to you obviously. . . . We are obviously
very appreciative of you having the confidence in us. And this is kind of our way of
paying you back a little bit. As legally as we can.55
The next month, the Florida law firm also announced its creation of a $25,000
scholarship fund for the benefit of the families of Sarasota firefighters—Sarasota’s
constituent members.56
49. See Garber v. Pharmacia Corp., Civ. A. No. 03-1519 (AET) (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2003) (memoran-
dum and order).
50. See Memorandum in Support of Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Set-
tlement and Plan of Allocation of Settlement Proceeds and an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses
and Lead Plaintiffs’ Expenses at 24, Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., C.A. No. 03-1519
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2012).
51. See Order Awarding Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 2, Alaska Elec. Pen-
sion Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., C.A. No. 03-1519 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2013).
52. Id.
53. City of Sarasota Firefighters Pension Board, Video of Firefighters’ Pension Board Meeting, GRANICUS.
COM (Mar. 27, 2013), http://sarasota.granicus.com/ViewPublisher.php?view_id=21 (discussion at
2:29–2:32). Notably, while the video of Sarasota’s board meeting does not identify the class “securi-
ties litigation case” as Garber, the timing is indicative. The meeting took place approximately two
months after the Garber court approved the relevant fee award. See supra note 51.
54. City of Sarasota Firefighters Pension Board, Video of Firefighters’ Pension Board Meeting, GRANICUS.
COM (Mar. 27, 2013), http://sarasota.granicus.com/ViewPublisher.php?view_id=21 (discussion at
2:29–2:32).
55. Id.
56. See City of Sarasota Firefighters’ Pension Board, Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Firefighters’
Pension Board of Trustees of April 24, 2013, GRANICUS.COM 3 (Aug. 24, 2013), http://sarasota.granicus.
com/MinutesViewer.php?view_id=21.&clip_id=5792.
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This arrangement is not unique: at least one other Florida public sector pen-
sion fund received a reduced monthly retainer from the same local law firm fol-
lowing that firm’s receipt of funds from a securities class action. The December
2011 minutes from the Pompano Beach Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Sys-
tem (“Pompano”) describe an agreement with its local Florida counsel to reduce
its monthly retainer by $2,000 for one year, based in part on income received
from class actions.57 Pompano stated that while the law firm was “not legally al-
lowed to share the fees that they receive for this work with their clients, they
[were] able to reevaluate fee arrangements based on all work performed on be-
half of a client and to take into account current economic conditions.”58 The
minutes also note that while Pompano would receive a discount for non-retainer
work, the law firm “wanted to be able to charge their full rates for securities lit-
igation work that they do on a contingency basis.”59 Pompano’s members also
enjoy a scholarship fund set up by the same firm, while the fund received at
least one other minor perk from its national counsel.60
The prevalence of this type of beneficial relationship between frequent-filing
class plaintiffs, their local counsel, and class counsel is impossible to estimate.
Florida has adopted strong “sunshine” laws requiring the boards of public sector
pension funds like Sarasota and Pompano to make meeting minutes publicly
available.61 Not all jurisdictions have such rules, however, nor do they apply
to private-sector labor union pension funds. Further, discussion of these ar-
rangements may occur in executive session and not be included in public min-
utes. While publicly available documents confirm that these arrangements exist,
they may not reflect the true scope of the problem.
State Street and Garber provide strong anecdotal evidence that the networks of
influence potentially compromising a lead plaintiff ’s independence are more
complex than may have been previously thought: they extend beyond simple
campaign contributions to include relationships with outside counsel who
may not appear on court papers.62 Such nuanced relationships rarely receive
judicial attention. The problem lies in the class leadership, class certification,
57. See Minutes, Pompano Beach Police and Firefighters’ Retirement System (Dec. 12, 2011),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UHm-RsX8NV1cx0L3EtJmZzzDSq187hce/view (noting that discount
was provided “as a result of receiving $500 thousand for the work that they performed in the Wash-
ington Mutual litigation”).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Broward College Scholarship Fund, POMPANO BEACH POLICE & FIREFIGHTERS’ RET. SYS. ( July 10,
2014), http://www.pbpfrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Broward-College-Scholarship-Fund-
Brochure-Revised-2014-07-10.pdf; see also, e.g., Minutes, POMPANO BEACH POLICE & FIREFIGHTERS’ RET.
SYS. ( Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.pbpfrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019-01-22-Minutes-
Final.pdf (describing to-be-filed gift disclosure form from national securities counsel relating to host-
ing a holiday dinner).
61. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 2019).
62. Scholarly attention has mostly focused on campaign donations by large class action law firms
to politicians with influence over public sector pension funds. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 8, at
650 (“We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs.”); Erickson, supra note 24, at
248–49; David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class
Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2080–81 (2010) (studying correlation between
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or settlement approval processes, and courts rarely delve deeper than the
relationship between class plaintiffs and the lead counsel who appear in an ac-
tion. This is true even in the Delaware Court of Chancery—often considered
America’s preeminent business court—as two recent class leadership contests
demonstrate.
In October 2018, the Court of Chancery reviewed competing applications for
leadership in a class action challenging the squeeze-out merger of AmTrust Fi-
nancial Service’s minority stockholders.63 Cambridge Retirement System (“Cam-
bridge”) sought the appointment of Labaton (along with two other firms) as lead
counsel, while Pompano (along with two other Florida pension funds) moved to
be appointed co-lead plaintiff alongside Cambridge and to have their law firms
added to the leadership team.64 In their competing motion papers, Pompano
Beach did not mention Labaton’s role in the State Street litigation, and Cam-
bridge did not discuss Pompano’s history of its local counsel’s forbearing from
increasing its non-contingency rates after receiving fees in class actions. Indeed,
the parties eventually stipulated a co-lead counsel arrangement, which the Court
of Chancery accepted.65 There is no indication that the Court of Chancery was
aware of, let alone approved, these potential conflicts of interest.66
Similarly, in March 2019, the Court of Chancery resolved a contested derivative
leadership dispute in favor of Steamfitters Local 499 Pension Plan (“Steamfitters”)
and their counsel (Labaton, along with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP)
in a case challenging Dell’s decision to redeem a certain class of outstanding
political donations and lead plaintiffs and concluding that “pay-to-play does not drive public pension
activism in securities litigation”).
The question of whether “pay to play” payments are illegal is separate from whether they represent
a conflict of interest. Such donations may be legal. See Estes, supra note 27 (“Thornton Law Firm
didn’t violate state campaign finance laws when it reimbursed its partners for up to $175,000 in do-
nations to state and local politicians, a special prosecutor said Wednesday.”). Even so, the existence of
payments between class counsel and plaintiffs who are meant to act as fiduciaries for a class presents
a potential conflict that at least merits disclosure. Corporate fiduciaries are required to disclose many
potential conflicts—even if legal—prior to a stockholder vote. See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holder
Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 73–74 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining merger pending disclosure of buyer’s assur-
ance of continued employment to target management). Surely stockholders should be similarly
aware, when asked whether to object to class certification or a settlement that will eliminate their
rights, whether their purported representative stands to receive some separate consideration. Cf.
DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(b), (c) (requiring certification that derivative plaintiff has not received compen-
sation from serving as a representative party in the action, absent court approval).
63. See Motion for Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Co-Lead Counsel, Cambridge Ret. Sys. v.
DeCarlo, C.A. No. 2018-0402-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2018) (public redacted version).
64. See The Pompano Group’s Motion to Appoint Co-Lead Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel, Pom-
pano Beach Police & Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. Zyskind, C.A. No. 2018-0396-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 18,
2018).
65. Pompano Beach Police & Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. Zyskind, C.A. No. 2018-0396-CB (Del. Ch.
Oct. 10, 2018) (order for appointment of co-lead plaintiffs and lead counsel).
66. Id. at 3 (noting, in appointing both Cambridge and Pompano, that “there are no apparent con-
flicts at issue”). Potential conflicts of interest remained unmentioned when a separate plaintiff, a large
investor, sought to resist a motion by lead counsel to consolidate the investor’s individual action into
the class action. See Arca’s Opposition to Motion to Consolidate and Cross-Motion to Coordinate or,
in the Alternative, to Appoint Arca as Co-Lead Plaintiff, In re AmTrust Fin. Servs. Inc. S’holder Litig.,
Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0396-AGB (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2019).
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stock.67 Two Florida pension funds (Hallandale Beach Police and Fire Retirement
Plan (“Hallandale”) and Miramar Police Officers’ Retirement Plan (“Miramar”))
filed a competing application for leadership, proposing alternate lead counsel.68
The docket does not reflect any discovery served by either of the opposing plain-
tiffs into the relationship between the proposed lead plaintiffs and their law
firms.69 The Florida pension funds did not discuss Labaton’s role in the State
Street litigation in their briefs to the court. Thus, in awarding leadership to Laba-
ton, the court held that “[n]o one has suggested that any of [the plaintiffs] have
any interest that would diverge from the class.”70
As in the AmTrust and Dell cases, the plaintiff/counsel relationship often
remains unexplored even when contingency firms vie for leadership.71 If even
adversarial plaintiffs do not bring the details of a client relationship to a court’s
attention, and defendants remain silent, such details will rarely, if ever, be
addressed.
V. PROPOSED REFORMS
The State Street, Garber, AmTrust, and Dell cases demonstrate that courts face
an informational vacuum in addressing conflicts of interest between securities
class action plaintiffs and their counsel. More often than not, no litigant stands
to gain by raising potential conflicts, particularly when the parties jointly present
a proposed settlement.72 Even when corporate defendants contest class certifica-
tion, they often have little incentive to raise issues that would disqualify a class
plaintiff: a successful challenge does not dismiss the action but instead offers an
opportunity for a less-compromised stockholder to take up the case. Thus, po-
tential conflicts either come to a court’s attention through the efforts of third par-
ties, or they never surface at all.
Current class certification procedures lack safeguards that would routinely
identify institutional plaintiffs’ potential conflicts of interest and, in particular,
67. See In re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL, 2019 WL 1259867
(Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 2019) (order). Friedman Oster & Tejtel PLLC and Andrews & Springer LLC also
formed part of the prevailing leadership team. See id. at *1.
68. See Brief in Support of Motion by Plaintiffs Hallandale Beach Police and Fire Retirement Plan
and Miramar Police Officers’ Retirement Plan for Appointment of Lead Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel, In
re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 2019) (public
redacted version).
69. To be clear, although there is no way of knowing what discovery would uncover, our review of
the publicly available minutes of the two Florida pension funds involved in the Dell case did not turn
up discussion of relationships between Hallandale or Miramar and their counsel similar to those
found in the public records concerning Sarasota or Pompano.
70. Dell Techs., 2019 WL 1259867, at *2.
71. One reason contingency law firms may be reticent to explore the attorney/client relationships
of competing lead plaintiffs is that they compete to provide services to opposing institutions. For in-
stance, Miramar’s minutes state that, as recently as October 2017, the fund decided to use Labaton to
provide certain unspecified services regarding securities. See Minutes of Meeting, MIRAMAR POLICE OF-
FICERS’ RET. PLAN (Oct. 5, 2017), https://miramarparks.org/DocumentCenter/View/9042/October-5-
2017-Minutes. Contingency firms may be wary of challenging actions taken by funds that are former
clients, or could be clients in the future.
72. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text
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their political interests. Otherwise, Labaton could not have paid at least half
a dozen “bare referral fees” to Chargois before the payments came to light.73
Similarly, the authors are unaware of any institutional plaintiff ever voluntarily
disclosing to a court that it received law-firm-funded academic scholarships or
reduced fees for non-contingency work. Thus, there is no judicial authority ad-
dressing whether these benefits are a “form of compensation . . . for prosecuting
or serving as a representative party” that would be inappropriate in Delaware
without court approval.74 If these arrangements are not brought to a court’s
attention, there never will be a judicial decision.
Class plaintiffs cannot be relied upon consistently to volunteer information
regarding potential conflicts, and the class action system cannot rely upon the Bos-
ton Globe or other journalists to provide unpaid adversarial research in every ac-
tion. However, the lessons learned from these cases could form the basis for a
number of reforms that would routinely surface conflicts of interest peculiar to in-
stitutional class plaintiffs.
A. INCREASED DISCLOSURE CONCERNING LEGAL FEES AND EXPENSES
The United States Chamber of Commerce recently urged Congress to enact a
“bill of rights for securities investors” requiring the disclosure of personal, pro-
fessional, and economic relationships between lead plaintiffs and their counsel in
securities class actions.75 The proposal is a good start: had the PSLRA contained
such provisions, the relationship between Labaton, Chargois, and ATRS might
have been uncovered long ago. However, this single reform may not be suffi-
cient: plaintiffs could respond by pursuing lawsuits in state court or by bringing
actions as individuals without seeking class certification.
At a minimum, plaintiffs should be required to identify at the outset of any
securities class action or derivative case, whether brought in federal or state
court, every law firm engaged on behalf of a plaintiff, its role in the case (whether
or not a firm formally appears as counsel on the docket), its proposed fee ar-
rangements, and any other personal, political, or economic relationships be-
tween counsel and client. This disclosure should be updated whenever a new
law firm is engaged and at class certification. As part of any fee petition, class
73. See Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., No. 11-cv-10230-MLW, at 124 (D.
Mass. June 28, 2018) (Master’s Report) (“Since the Chargois Arrangement began in 2008, Labaton
has represented ATRS in at least nine cases for which it has paid Chargois a percentage of Labaton’s
total fee award.”). Labaton’s internal review maintains that there were only seven payments of “bare
referral fees,” including the State Street litigation. See Brown Report, supra note 44, at 11–12.
74. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(aa).
75. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONTAINING THE CONTAGION: PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE BRO-
KEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM 18 (Feb. 2019), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/research/
containing-the-contagion-proposals-to-reform-the-broken-securities-class-action-system [hereinafter
CONTAGION]; see also U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, A RISING THREAT: THE NEW CLASS ACTION
RACKET THAT HARMS INVESTORS AND THE ECONOMY 23 (Oct. 2018), https://www.instituteforlegal reform.
com/uploads/sites/1/A_Rising_Threat_Research_Paper-web_1.pdf (encouraging Congress to take up
PSLRA reform to confront purportedly “abusive practices that undermine the ability of parties and
the courts to address the merits of securities class action claims”).
1564 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 75, Winter 2019–2020
counsel should also disclose the number of hours each firm and attorney
has committed to the litigation. Information concerning a law firm’s hourly
rates should include any discounts given to the class representative in non-
contingency work. If a firm employs contract attorneys at a low hourly rate, that
rate should also be disclosed, as well as whether the firm has ever charged a paying
client the markup rate proposed to a reviewing court. Armed with this informa-
tion, courts and absent stockholders would be able to evaluate whether fees are
reasonable and identify the type of “bare referral fee” at issue in State Street.
In context, the mere existence of referral agreements or other inducements
that might tilt institutional investors toward participation in securities class or
derivative litigation may not overly concern courts. Once disclosed, potential
conflicts may be assessed and considered. Some benefits, such as a cup of coffee,
may be so small that a court would not view them as disabling. Others—such as
the “favors, political activity, money spent and time dedicated in Arkansas” un-
covered in the State Street Litigation—may prompt further judicial scrutiny. Im-
portantly, courts can only review and approve or disapprove of conflicts after
they come to light.
Analogous disclosure procedures from other areas of law provide a roadmap
for reform. For instance, some courts and legislatures require litigants to disclose
third-party litigation financing arrangements in class action cases.76 Similarly, at-
torneys seeking to work on behalf of certain entities in bankruptcy cases must
disclose, among other things, “any proposed arrangement for compensation,
and, to the best of the applicant’s knowledge, all of the person’s connections
with the debtor, creditors, [or] any other party in interest.”77 Failure to identify
and disclose relationships may result in courts cutting fee awards substantially.78
In a similar manner, courts could provide, by local rule or specific order, that
stockholder class action plaintiffs and lead counsel disclose all law firms that stand
to receive payment in a case. In the alternative, Congress could require disclosure
of entities entitled to receive fees, perhaps as an amendment to the PSLRA.
76. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., Standing Order for All Judges of the Northern
District of California 2 (effective Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/siorders (requiring
disclosure of “any person or entity funding the prosecution of any claim or counterclaim” in any “pro-
posed class, collective, or representative action”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.01 (West 2018) (requiring
disclosure of “any agreement under which any person, other than an attorney permitted to charge
a contingent fee representing a party, has a right to receive compensation that is contingent on
and sourced from any proceeds of the civil action, by settlement, judgment, or otherwise”). It is un-
clear whether a rule like Wisconsin’s—which does not apply to attorneys permitted to charge a con-
tingency fee—would have resulted in the disclosure of the payments to Chargois.
77. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a). The rule requires attorneys and other professional service providers
to identify potential conflicts of interest for the court. See In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir.
1987) (explaining that lawyers seeking to receive fees in bankruptcy proceedings have “a responsi-
bility to leave no reasonable stone unturned in bringing [potential conflicts of interest or other rela-
tionships] to a head at the earliest practical moment”).
78. See In re Byington, 454 B.R. 648, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2011) (“Published bankruptcy court
decisions are quite consistent in requiring that debtors-in-possession and their attorneys, whose em-
ployment is sought to be approved, be meticulous in disclosing ‘all connections’ with the debtor and
other parties in interest, the failure to do so justifying a court’s taking significant punitive or correc-
tive action.”).
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Disclosure-based reforms, however, have a limited track record of success and
are unlikely to be a panacea on their own. The PSLRA already includes similar
measures that attempt to restrain “professional plaintiffs,” in part by requiring
plaintiffs to identify any other PSLRA-related actions filed in a preceding
three-year period.79 The results have been, at best, mixed. Some repeat plaintiffs
have responded by recasting their filings as individual actions or shareholder de-
rivative actions, rather than securities class action complaints.80 Others simply
omit earlier cases from their certifications.81
A disclosure rule only incentivizes class plaintiffs to disclose potential conflicts
if they perceive a risk of being caught—and punished—for noncompliance.82
Busy courts may have difficulty enforcing disclosure regimes. Class certification
motions routinely confront jurists with hundreds of pages of information.83 Even
if class plaintiffs disclose information concerning conflicts of interest, courts may
not have the time to scrutinize them effectively. Normally, courts expect a party’s
adversary to surface the key facts necessary for judicial review. An effective class
certification regime may, therefore, require courts to engineer adversaries—and
adversarial process—when no effective adversary exists.
B. RESTORING ADVERSARIAL SCRUTINY TO THE CLASS
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The Boston Globe’s investigation prompted the State Street court to look more
closely into the relationship between Thornton, Labaton, Chargois, and ATRS,
when earlier courts had not.84 Rather than rely upon the occasional journalistic
expose´, however, courts can restore regular adversarial review to the class
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v) (2018).
80. See, e.g., Complaint for Violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Carlyle v. Akorn, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-05022 (M.D. La. June 20, 2017) (individual plaintiff ’s
complaint to enjoin corporate merger based on allegedly misleading proxy statement); cf. Jessica
Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089, 1135 (2013)
(“[T]he legal system has not won the war against professional plaintiffs. Instead these plaintiffs
may have simply moved into new legal territory.”).
81. As Professor Erickson has noted, although “[t]he PSLRA requires plaintiffs to identify all other
securities class actions ‘in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a representative party’ . . . [m]any
shareholders appear to have interpreted this requirement to require disclosure only of the suits in
which shareholders have sought to serve as lead plaintiff.” Erickson, supra note 80, at 1135. This in-
terpretation persists despite federal opinions criticizing the practice. See, e.g., In re OSI Pharms., Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 04-CV-5505 ( JS) (ETB), 2005 WL 6171305, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2005) (“It can-
not be seriously argued that a party commencing a securities class action does not seek to serve as a
‘representative party on behalf of a class.’”); Greater Penn. Carpenters Pension Fund v. Whitehall Jew-
ellers, Inc., No. 04 C 1107, 2005 WL 1563206, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2005).
82. Notably, neither the OSI Pharmaceuticals nor Greater Pennsylvania Carpenters Pension Fund rul-
ings disqualified non-compliant plaintiffs as class representatives. Both courts merely allowed
the plaintiffs to refile amended certifications and try again. See OSI Pharms., 2005 WL 6171305,
at *9; GPCPF, 2005 WL 1563206, at *6.
83. The motion for final approval in Garber, for instance, weighs in at over 480 pages of text, in-
cluding exhibits. See Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of
Allocation of Settlement Proceeds and an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and Lead Plaintiffs’
Expenses, Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., C.A. No. 03-1519 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2012).
84. See supra text accompanying note 73.
1566 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 75, Winter 2019–2020
certification process by appointing class guardians or other proxies for absent
class members.
The idea is not novel. In a similar nonadversarial context—the settlement of a
wage-and-hour class action—California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu rec-
ommended that trial courts consider appointing a “devil’s advocate” to raise argu-
ments against class action fee arrangements.85 Similarly, the Delaware Court of
Chancery allows its judges to appoint amicus curiae, with fees taxed to the settling
parties, to argue against settlements in mergers and acquisitions cases.86 These
calls to action have gone largely unheeded, however: trial courts do not routinely
appoint special masters to undertake State-Street-style investigations.
Similarly, the United States Chamber of Commerce suggests that courts could
appoint “independent monitor[s]” to scrutinize plaintiff ’s fee requests.87 Again,
the Chamber’s proposed reform would be helpful, but insufficient to protect
stockholder interests. If a compromised plaintiff enters into a suboptimal settle-
ment with defendants, stockholders are harmed not merely by an unearned fee
but by the loss of the right to pursue a potentially valuable case. Thus, any court-
appointed monitor should be instructed to investigate, and potentially challenge,
any proposed stockholder settlement—not merely the fee award.
The regular appointment of a class guardian to contest settlements and fee mo-
tions would surface and discourage “pay to play” arrangements, dubious “referral
fees,” and other potential conflicts facing institutional class plaintiffs. As a court-
appointed litigant, a class guardian could engage in limited discovery to uncover
an institutional stockholder’s litigation history, the identity of all of their legal
representatives, and any relationships between those attorneys and relevant
political actors.88 Because the guardian’s pay would not be contingent upon
85. See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 376 P.3d 672, 691 (Cal. 2016) (Liu, J., concurring); see
also William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 1435, 1475–77 (2006) (arguing for a devil’s advocate to evaluate substantive settlements
in class actions). In Laffitte, Justice Liu contrasted consumer class actions, which lack effective mon-
itors, with the purportedly greater monitoring role of institutional plaintiffs in securities litigation. See
Laffitte, 376 P.3d at 691.
86. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch. 2016). Although the
Court of Chancery has proposed appointing such amici, to date we are unaware of it actually
doing so.
87. See CONTAGION, supra note 75, at 18.
88. The regular appointment of class guardians would also reduce the “cat and mouse” nature of
securities litigation reform, in which courts or Congress respond to perceived abusive litigation by
proposing new rules, and class litigants respond by seeking new loopholes in the reforms. For in-
stance, many contingency law firms responded to the Court of Chancery’s Trulia opinion by filing
M&A lawsuits in non-Delaware courts, citing older Delaware precedent, and simply not mentioning
Trulia to the non-Delaware court. See William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with
Trulia, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 145,
165–69 (Stephen M. Bainbridge, Iman Anabtawi, Sung Hui Kim & James Park eds., 2018).
Reformers cannot anticipate every potential means by which entrepreneurial contingency counsel
may attempt to circumvent reforms and channel rents to class plaintiffs. For instance, a firm might
attempt to conceal the role of an attorney similar to Chargois in the State Street litigation, even after
the disclosure reforms described above, by hiring the attorney as an in-house “of counsel,” paying
him or her a salary (including a “performance bonus” not nominally linked to case payouts), and
then not disclosing that attorney’s involvement in the case. Contingency counsel are more likely to
forego seeking novel forms of Chargois-style relationships if they know that a court-appointed adver-
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the success of the settlement or fee motion, she would have every incentive to
bring relevant issues to a court’s attention. Reviewing courts could then consider
a complete record and determine which relationships are and are not disabling
conflicts of interest.
Delaware courts could adopt such reforms more easily than their federal coun-
terparts. The Court of Chancery’s rules already permit the appointment of attor-
neys ad litem to advocate for the interest of persons with alleged disabilities, and
these rules require petitioners for guardianship to pay for the cost of the ad litem
at a fixed rate.89 A similar rule could require the appointment of stockholder
guardians in class action and derivative cases. As Delaware law vests the Chan-
cellor with the unilateral authority to adopt rules of procedure that apply to all
Chancery judges, legislative intervention would likely be unnecessary.90
Uniform application of a new federal rule, however, would likely require con-
gressional action, through an amendment either to the PSLRA or to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, individual federal jurisdictions could adopt
local rules consistent with the authority cited in the State Street litigation that
require the appointment of special master as part of the settlement process.91
While patchwork federal and state reforms would provide a laboratory for pol-
icy experimentation, Delaware’s experience with reform of mergers and acquisi-
tions class actions suggests that uniform federal regulation may be necessary.
Class plaintiffs responded to Delaware’s new and more stringent standards for
the review of disclosure settlements, announced in early 2016,92 not by seeking
more valuable settlements but by filing class actions in other jurisdictions.93 As a
result, the number of M&A class actions filed in federal courts doubled in 2016
and then doubled again in 2017.94 This flight from increased judicial scrutiny
became even more obvious after the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit became the first federal circuit to adopt Delaware’s standards—and
the only circuit to see a decline in M&A litigation in 2017.95
If only a handful of federal courts require the appointment of class guardians,
plaintiffs and their counsel can be expected to follow the same race-to-the-
bottom strategy of filing lawsuits in the jurisdictions that apply the least rigorous
sary will be investigating them ex post, even if it may arguably fit within a loophole to disclosure rules
proposed ex ante.
89. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 176.
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 361 (West 2019).
91. See supra note 36.
92. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“practitioners should
expect that the Court will continue to be increasingly vigilant in applying its independent judgment
to its case-by-case assessment of the reasonableness of the “give” and “get” of such settlements in light
of the concerns discussed above”).
93. The shift from state to federal courts parallels the shift from federal to state courts in the wake
of PSLRA’s passage. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305, 325
(2015) (describing how after federal procedural reforms “a significant volume of cases simply shifted
away from federal to state courts”).
94. See NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2017 FULL-
YEAR REVIEW 5 ( Jan. 29, 2018).
95. See id. at 12.
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scrutiny. Thus, congressional action may be required to ensure that reforms do
not simply result in increased forum shopping by class counsel.
C. MAKE CANDOR TO STOCKHOLDERS AN EXPLICIT
COMPONENT OF ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
Courts and legislatures should also impose more stringent consequences upon
plaintiffs and law firms that fail to comply with disclosure requirements relating
to their conflicts of interest or fee requests. Many of the law firms engaged in
securities litigation are repeat players, filing dozens or hundreds of stockholder
actions.96 Even with more robust disclosure requirements, malfeasance may re-
main profitable for law firms willing to conceal conflicts of interest between
themselves and their clients so long as they are not caught immediately and
they retain the profit from prior cases. Even when plaintiffs violate existing
PSLRA disclosure requirements, they rarely face significant penalties.97
Disclosure reforms can be meaningfully amplified if courts hold that plaintiffs
or counsel who either fail to disclose information pertaining to potential conflicts
of interest or engage in disapproved practices such as “bare referral fees” have
provided inadequate representation to absent class members and are not suitable
to serve as representatives in future class actions. A plaintiff or law firm found to
have engaged in such practices could be forced to disclose its conduct to
other courts and other cases. If federal courts are not willing to adopt such
best practices on their own, Congress could require them to do so by amending
the PSLRA.
More certain and severe penalties might mitigate the need for class guardians.
Consider the incentives facing contingency counsel in a court that announces
that it will appoint a special master to examine one out of every five securities
cases. If contingency counsel knows that problematic conduct will be uncovered
20 percent of the time, it may compensate by requesting slightly higher fees as
part of settlement. If, however, counsel expects that wrongful conduct will result
in its exclusion from dozens of future class actions, the threat of random scrutiny
may be sufficient to deter misbehavior, at least for law firms where class actions
make up a considerable percentage of fees. In this regard, it is worth recalling the
State Street court’s consternation at learning that the “regular rates” for a law
firm’s services had “never been charged to paying clients.”98
96. See, e.g., Brown Report, supra note 44, at 4–5 (describing cases brought by, inter alia, Labaton’s
“Securities” and “Delaware” practice groups); Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891–92 (describing attorneys whose
lawsuits serve no purpose for stockholders but are who are “regular players in the enterprise of rou-
tinely filing hastily drafted complaints on behalf of stockholders on the heels of the public announce-
ment of a deal and settling quickly on terms that yield no monetary compensation to the stockholders
they represent”).
97. See, e.g., supra notes 81–82.
98. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., C.A. No. 11-10230-MLW, 2018 WL
3216012, at *12 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The State Street case demonstrates that stockholder class actions are sufficiently
profitable to allow class counsel to earmark a significant portion of its contin-
gency fees for client acquisition and to pay counsel who does little work apart
from generating an initial introduction.99 It is difficult to guess at the scope of
the problem. Labaton’s internal investigation, conducted by a retired judge, con-
cluded that Labaton’s payments to Chargois were “unique and aberrational.”100
Labaton’s co-chairman now insists that “[w]e will not honor any referral relation-
ship or referral agreement from now until the end of time unless it’s in full com-
pliance with the rules and our new standards, heightened standards, we put in
place.”101 On the other hand, Labaton instituted these “new standards” after
the State Street court uncovered a $4.1 million payment to Chargois, a decade
after the payments began.102 How many other law firms currently have similar
relationships with third parties to smooth the path to a client’s door?
The failure of current class certification procedures to root out conflicts of in-
terest between plaintiffs and their counsel is not new. The Lerach investigation
began with a turncoat plaintiff; the State Street litigation kicked off after a news-
paper expose. Neither came to light through class certification processes, and the
State Street litigation proves that the PSLRA did not close every avenue by which
class counsel can redirect fees to third parties in the hopes of garnering lucrative
lead counsel appointments.
The class certification system should not depend upon journalists or other for-
tuitous circumstances to unearth potential conflicts of interest between class
plaintiffs and their counsel. By mandating that plaintiffs disclose greater detail
concerning the attorneys who stand to gain from class litigation and appointing
class guardians to ensure that these disclosures are accurate, courts can uncover
these hidden relationships on their own. The result would be a better stock-
holder class action system, in which plaintiffs are more likely to file class actions
with an eye toward advancing the good of their fellow stockholders, rather than
their own interests or those of their counsel.
99. See Coffee, supra note 15 (“[A]lthough plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities litigation do face real
risk in some cases, there seem to be significant ‘rents’ in the fee award system if they can willingly
surrender 20 percent of their revenues (over a series of cases) simply for the introduction.”).
100. Brown Report, supra note 44, at 1.
101. Id. at 15.
102. See id. at 10 (policy against “bare referral” fees instituted “within the last year”); id. at 12 (pay-
ments made to Chargois since 2007).
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